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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
ANTITRUST-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-Clayton Act 
Statute of Limitations Tolled on Treble Damage 
Suits Against Non-Government Defendant 
Co-Conspirators-Michigan v. 
Morton Salt Co.* 
Plaintiffs,1 several states and smaller governmental units, filed 
related antitrust treble damage claims2 against ten rock salt com-
panies that had allegedly conspired to fix prices.3 These private ac-
tions were instituted subsequent to civil and criminal antitrust pro-
ceedings brought by the federal government in which four of the 
ten companies had been named as defendants4 and five designated as 
co-conspirators but not prosecuted.5 Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act 
• 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff d sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 
377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967) [the district court litigation will hereinafter be cited as 
principal case.] The only issue decided on appeal was the application of the tolling 
provision to non-government defendants. 
1. Plaintiffs in the consolidated actions included the states of Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, and "Wisconsin as well as various governmental 
units within these states. 
2. These treble damage claims were brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act which 
provides: 
That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court 
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or 
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover 
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
38 Stat. 131 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964). 
3. Defendants were American Salt Co. (American), Barton Salt Co. (Barton), Carey 
Salt Co. (Carey), Cargill, Inc. (Cargill), Cargo Carriers, Inc. (Cargo), Cutler-Magner Co. 
(Cutler-Magner), Diamond Crystal Salt Co. (Diamond), Hardy Salt Co. (Hardy), Inter-
national Salt Co. (International), and Morton Salt Co. (Morton). 
4. On June 28, 1961 an indictment was returned in the District of Minnesota 
against Morton, International, Diamond, and Carey alleging that they had conspired to 
fix the prices of rock salt in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., Criminal No. 4-61, Cr. No. 65, D. Minn.-On July 11, 1961 the gov-
ernment instituted a corresponding civil proceeding in which it sought injunctive 
relief against the same alleged violations by the same defendants. United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., Civil No. 4-61, Civ. No. 162, D. Minn. However, prior to trial of the 
criminal action, defendant Carey pleaded nolo contendere, and entered a consent de-
cree in the civil action on March 26, 1962. The civil suit against the remaining three 
defendants was then suspended pending the outcome of the parallel criminal action. 
On June 7, 1962 the defendants obtained a verdict in their favor. The civil trial 
then was reconvened, and on September 18, 1963 defendant International submitted 
a stipulation for a consent decree. This decree was signed and entered on November 
4, 1963 and became operative on January 5, 1964. Pursuant to agreement, the civil 
case against Morton and Diamond was tried on the record established in the criminal 
action, supplemented by interrogatories and answers. An amended final judgment 
adverse to Morton and Diamond was entered on February 19, 1965, and this decision 
was subsequently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on October 25, 1965. 
Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 382 U.S. 44 (1965). 
5. Defendants mentioned as co-conspirators in the government litigation but not 
named as defendants were American, Barton, Hardy, Cutler-Magner, and Cargill. 
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provides that when such actions are brought by the government, 
"the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every private 
right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part 
on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended 
during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter . . . ."6 
Plaintiffs filed their claims within one year of the termination of 
the last of the government suits but ·more than four years after the 
occurrence of the alleged violations. The six companies not prose-
cuted by the government claimed that the tolling provisions of sec-
tion 5(b) applied only to former government defendants, and, con-
sequently, that the private actions against them were barred by the 
Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations.7 The United States 
Cargo was neither a named defendant nor a designated co-conspirator in the govern-
ment litigation. 
6. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). 
7. These defendants relied on numerous cases limiting the application of § 5(b) to 
government defendants. E.g., cases cited in note 17 infra. The tolling provision of 
§ 5(b) of the Clayton Act provides as follows: 
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to 
prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not in-
cluding an action under section 15(a) of this title, the running of the statute of 
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws and 
based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall 
be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: Provided, 
however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitatio'ls in respect of a 
cause of action arising under section 15 of this title is suspended hereunder, any 
action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced 
either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of 
action accrued. 
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964). 
The four companies that were former government defendants argued that the 
statute of limitations barred some of the plaintiffs' claims against them, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the statute had been tolled as to these companies. Defendant Carey 
maintained that the government criminal and civil actions against it were terminated 
on March 26, 1962 when a plea of nolo contendere was entered in the criminal action 
and a consent decree entered in the civil action. It argued that therefore, since the 
earliest filing of a private damage claim against it occurred on December 30, 1964, this 
and all subsequent claims were barred both by the four-year statute of limitations pro-
vided by § 4B (the causes of action having arisen more than four years prior to the 
filing of the damage claims) and by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to 
damage claims based on violations prosecuted in earlier government litigation as pro-
vided for in § 5(b) (nearly two years having elapsed between the termination of gov-
ernment proceedings against defendant Carey and the filing of damage claims). 
Defendant International contended that, with respect to it, the government proceed-
ings terminated with its consent decree in the civil suit, and, because only the action 
brought by the State of Illinois was commenced within the following twelve-month 
period, Illinois alone was accorded any benefit by § 5(b). Finally, defendants Diamond 
and Morton claimed that all actions filed after June 7, 1963 were barred by the one-year 
statute of limitations since § 5(b) provides for tolling during only one government 
proceeding. Thus they argued that after termination of the criminal proceeding on 
June 7, 1962 the statute of limitations commenced to run notwithstanding the fact 
that the civil suit did not terminate until October 25, 1965. Brief of Diamond Crystal 
Salt Co. and Morton Salt Co., pp. 5-6, principal case. 
In response to these assertions, plaintiffs made three arguments: (I) that the gov-
ernment litigation had caused the tolling of the statute of limitations as to all of the 
private defendants, whether or not they had been parties to the government suit; 
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District Court for Minnesota held that the Clayton Act's statute of 
limitations can be tolled as to parties not prosecuted by the govern-
ment, and that such tolling commences when the government in-
stitutes a related criminal or civil proceeding for violation of the 
antitrust laws against any alleged co-conspirator and terminates 
when the related government litigation is concluded. Thus, the court 
held that none of the plaintiffs' actions was time-barred. 8 
In so holding, the court in the principal case failed to distinguish 
benveen nvo related, but nonetheless distinct, criteria which deter-
mine the application of section 5(b): "identity of matters" and 
"party scope." "Identity of matters" refers to the degree of similarity 
that is required between a private plaintiff's treble damage claim and 
prior government litigation before the plaintiff can properly claim 
that the government action tolled the statute of limitations. Section 
5(b) requires that the private right of action must be based "in 
whole or in part on any matter complained of" in the government 
proceeding.0 "Party scope" is concerned with the identification of 
those parties against whom the statute has been tolled. The court in 
the principal case reasoned that since no language in section 5(b) 
specifically relates to "party scope," the statute of limitations may be 
tolled with regard to every private right of action that satisfies the 
"identity of matters" requirement. Thus, the court in effect ren-
dered nugatory the question of "party scope." This interpretation 
of section 5(b) is, however, unwarranted. 
The court in interpreting the "party scope" limitation based its 
decision in part on language in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing 
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,10 and Leh v. General Petro-
leum Corp.11 In Minnesota Mining a private plaintiff instituted 
antitrust actions against both Minnesota Mining and Essex, although 
Essex had not been a defendant in the prior government litigation. 
(2) that such tolling began with the commencement of the first grand jury proceeding 
against any of the alleged conspirators, and terminated upon the conclusion of the 
la5t of the government suits maintained against those conspirators; and (3) that plain-
tiffs were not precluded by the statute of limitations from proceeding against any 
conspiring party, since their claims were all filed within one year of the termination of 
a related government suit against one of the present defendants. In short, plaintiffs 
maintained that they had complied with the statute of limitations. Brief for the State 
of Michigan, p. 5, principal case. 
8. On the facts before it, the court found that the running of the statute of limita-
tions was suspended on June 28, 1961 when the first indictment based on the alleged 
conspiracy was filed, and began running again on October 25, 1965 with the Supreme 
Court's affirmation of the civil judgments entered against the last of the prosecuted 
conspirators. 
9. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), quoted in note 7 supra. 
10. 381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
11. 382 U.S. 54 (1965). The opinion in the principal case cites the following lan-
guage from the Leh decision: "[I']he private plaintiff is not required to allege that the 
same means were used to achieve the same objectives of the same conspiracies by the 
same defendants." Id. at 59. 
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The Supreme Court held that inclusion of Essex as a private de-
fendant had not impaired the necessary "identity of matters." Simi-
larly, in Leh the Supreme Court held that there was sufficient identity 
between the government litigation and a later treble damage claim 
to toll the statute of limitations, even though the private action was 
brought against only six of the eight government defendants. The 
Court reasoned that, even in the absence of the remaining govern-
ment defendants, there was still a substantial relation between the 
substantive bases of the actions; furthermore, the policy of encourag-
ing antitrust enforcement by private plaintiffs was felt to outweigh 
the need for complete party identity.12 In both Minnesota Mining 
and Leh, however, the party objecting to the tolling was a former 
government defendant;13 thus, it must be recognized that these de-
cisions merely held that a private plaintiff could sue parties not 
prosecuted by the government together with former government 
defendants, and still satisfy the "identity" requirement of section 5(b). 
In neither case was tolling as to the non-government defendants 
("party scope") an issue before the Supreme Court.14 Furthermore, 
12. Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1965). The courts initially 
construed the "identity of matters" clause as requiring that the private plaintiff allege 
not only the same antitrust violation which the government had prosecuted, but also 
that the same means were used to reach the same objectives by the same defendants 
as were the subject matter of the government action. Steiner v. Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1956). This construction was based on the 
premise that since §§ 5(a) &: (b) are complementary, they must be read together. Having 
made this assumption, the courts concluded that since § 5(a) limits the use of govern-
ment-secured judgments in order to insure that the party against whom the decree 
is used has had an opportunity to litigate fully those issues of which the decision is 
dispositive, § 5(b) is impliedly restricted by the principles of collateral estoppel. 
The Ninth Circuit later clarified the Steiner standard as requiring only that, with 
respect to § 5(b), the private action be based in part on a matter complained of in the 
government prosecution, and not that all matters complained of necessarily find a 
counterpart in the government action. Twentieth Centry Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 
328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964). Shortly thereafter, the Tenth Circuit adopted a similar 
test. Union Carbide &: Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. 
denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1963). Although the Tenth Circuit required only a substantial 
identity between the private and government suits, it expressly rejected the Ninth 
Circuit's conclusion that the complementary nature of §§ 5(a) &: (b) necessitates the 
incorporation of a collateral estoppel limitation into the latter. The Supreme Court 
settled this "incorporation" dispute by ruling that the restrictions of collateral estop-
pel are not implicit in the language of § 5(b), and, consequently, that its scope is not 
restricted by such considerations. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood 
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
13. In Minnesota Mining the Supreme Court was presented with only that part of 
the district court's ruling which involved Minnesota Mining since the lower court's 
decision that the statute of limitations had not been tolled as to Essex was not ap-
pealed. In Leh the case against the non-government defendant (Olympic Oil Co.) was 
dismissed prior to the ruling on defendants' statute of limitations defense. Leh v. Gen-
eral Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 61 n.4 (1965). 
14. Admittedly, some language in these recent Supreme Court opinions, taken out 
of context, appears to support the conclusion reached in the principal case. In Leh 
the Court said: 
In suits of this kind, the absence of complete identity of defendants may be ex-
plained on several grounds unrelated to the question of whether the private 
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the district court in Minnesota Mining had sustained the non-
government defendant's claim that it was not subject to tolling 
under section 5(b),15 and, although this issue was not appealed, the 
Third Circuit indicated support for this decision in dictum.16 
The court in the principal case did not view its opinion as an 
independent rejection of the many prior contrary decisions which 
refused to toll the statute of limitations as to non-government de-
fendants;17 rather, it saw itself as following the precedent laid down 
in Minnesota Mining and Leh which the court thought overruled the 
rationale of the earlier cases.18 It assumed that the contrary decisions 
were based on the incorporation into section 5(b) of the principles 
of collateral estoppel expressed in section 5(a).19 Thus, the court 
interpreted the Supreme Court's rejection, in Minnesota Mining 
and in Leh, of this "incorporation doctrine"20 as overruling the 
earlier contrary cases sub silentio. However, the court's interpreta-
tion of the earlier cases appears to be mistaken. These cases 'did 
not rely on the incorporation doctrine; instead, several of these 
decisions, without making any reference to the principles of col-
lateral estoppel, either regarded the limitation of the application of 
the tolling provisions to former government defendants as self-
evident or rejected the argument in favor of extending section 5(b) 
to non-government defendants as "a surprising theory of con-
claimant's suit is based on matters of which the Government complained. • • • 
[S]ome of the conspirators whose activities injured the private claimant may have 
been too low in the conspiracy to be selected as named defendants or co-conspira-
tors in the Government's necessarily broader net. 
The court in the principal case read this language in light of the Supreme Court's 
general mandate to maximize the benefits accruing to private claimants from govern-
ment litigation. However, again it must be emphasized that the Court wrote the 
quoted passage in response to a claim by a former government defendant that tolling 
was not warranted as to it because the "identity of matters" requirement of § 5(b) was 
not satisfied. Read in this light, the language only implies that the presence of a non-
government defendant in a later private damage claim does not, in and of itself, 
impair the requisite "identity of matters." It in no way supports a conclusion that 
tolling against non-government defendants is proper. 
15. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp. 
507 (D.N.J. 1963). 
16. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 
360 n.15 (3d Cir. 1964) (dictum). 
17. See, e.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th 
Cir. 1954); Momand v. Universal Film Exch., Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. 
denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Charles Rubenstein Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 176 F. 
Supp. 527 (D. Minn. 1959) (wholly owned subsidiary of a government defendant); 
Court Degraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (unimpli-
cated subsidiary of a defendant parent corporation); Electric Theatre Co. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937 (W .D. Mo. 1953) (party to a nationwide 
conspiracy not included as a defendant in the prosecution of that conspiracy). 
18. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra. 
19. Principal case at 53-54. 
20. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 
316-21 (1965); Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1965). 
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struction."21 Those opinions which did rely to some degree on the 
theory of incorporation also suggested that their decisions could 
have rested independently on the alternative grounds of logic or 
public policy. 22 
On the other hand, some support can be found, both in a literal 
reading of section 5(b) and in an examination of its underlying 
policy considerations, for a broader interpretation of the section 
than that which is found in the earlier cases or which can be inferred 
from congressional inaction in the face of those decisions. First, 
section 5(b) contains no specific language which would indicate a 
"party scope" limitation; in fact, if read literally, the statute is to 
be tolled as to every private right of action that is based in whole 
or in part on a related government proceeding. 23 Second, since 
private damage claims constitute an important branch of antitrust 
enforcement,24 Congress has eased the evidentiary burden on private 
plaintiffs by providing them with access to the fruits of prior govern-
ment investigation and litigation. Specifically, the private plaintiff 
21. Charles Rubenstein, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 154 F. Supp. 216, 218 (D. 
Minn. 1957), afj'd, 289 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1961); see Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 
Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); Court Degraw 
Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
22. E.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 
1954). 
23. Although an interpretation of this kind is logical, congressional inaction mili-
tates against such a literal reading and, in fact, argues for a "party scope" limitation 
which is satisfied only when tolling is restricted to former government defendants. 
Because Congress has been silent as to the intended "party scope" of § 5(b), it has 
devolved upon the judiciary to determine how this section should be applied. Con-
cluding that neither logic nor public policy considerations would permit tolling of the 
statute of limitations on claims against all private defendants without regard to 
whether they had been defendants in the prior government litigation, the courts 
restricted the application of § 5(b) to former government defendants. See, e.g., Momand 
v. Universal Film Exch., Inc., 172 F.2d 37, 48 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 
967 (1949). Prior to 1955 when Congress amended § 5(b), all courts faced with the 
"party scope" question had interpreted the provision in this manner. And although 
the 1955 amendments revised certain sections of the Clayton Act in response to judi-
cial interpretations-§ 4A of the amended act authorizes damage suits instituted by 
the United States contrary to the opinion expressed in United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 
600 (1941)-Congress did not alter § 5(b). A compelling inference to be drawn from 
this silence is that Congress concurred with the settled judicial construction which 
limits application of the tolling provision to former government defendants. And 
indeed, all decisions subsequent to the 1955 revision, with the exception of the princi-
pal case, have adhered to the "government defendant limitation." See, e.g., Court 
Degraw Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1959). 
24. See Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 131 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), quoted in note 
2 supra. The "entire provision [was] intended to help persons of small means who are 
injured in their property or business by combinations or corporations violating the 
antitrust laws." H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). In fixing the amount 
of redress at three times the value of the actual injury sustained, Congress intended 
not only to create a convincing deterrent to potential antitrust violators, but also to 
provide an incentive for private prosecution, thereby enlisting an auxiliary force 
of investigators to supplement the Justice Department's enforcement of the antitrust 
laws. Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J. 1940). 
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receives the following benefits: prima fade effect is given to final 
judgments entered against government defendants;25 rulings on 
25. The principles of coIIateral estoppel limit such effect to those government 
defendants against whom the judgments were entered. Section 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964) provides: 
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or 
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-
trust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shaII be prima facie 
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other 
party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under section 
15a of this title, as to aII matters respecting which said judgment or decree would 
be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall 
not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been 
taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a of this title. 
In the principal case, however, the court held that a government judgment and 
the findings upon which it is based may be considered in determining the prima fade 
effect which is to be given a consent decree previously entered in the litigation by an 
alleged co-conspirator and government defendant. Principal case at 61 (supplemental 
decision). International, Morton and Diamond were named as government defendants, 
and although International entered into a consent decree prior to judgment against 
Morton and Diamond, the court reasoned that the consent decree was nonetheless en-
titled to prima fade effect against International because the actual taking of testimony 
used in the proceeding occurred before the consent decree was entered. More spe-
cifically, the civil proceeding from which the consent decree and judgment resulted 
relied primarily on a record established in a prior criminal prosecution of the same 
three defendants which terminated with a verdict in their favor. Therefore, while the 
civil consent decree arguably was entered prior to the submission of testimony (though 
the decree and Morton and Diamond's stipulation as to use of the criminal record were 
filed on the same date), the decree was entered after the taking of the testimony in 
the criminal case upon which the civil judgment was subsequently based. 
In defense, International contended unsuccessfully that as to it neither the consent 
decree nor the judgment used to interpret the prima facie effect to be given the decree 
satisfied the conditions requisite to prima facie effect as provided for in § 5(a): that 
neither the decree nor the judgment constituted a finding of an antitrust violation, 
and that as to the allegations of the complaint, International had not had its day 
in court. 
In response to the latter contention, the court stated that since the indictment and 
the complaint were virtually identical, International had received the opportunity to 
litigate required by due process in the application of the principles of collateral estoppel. 
As to the former ground of objection, it emphasized that, although International was 
neither a party to nor specifically mentioned in the judgment, the findings of fact 
upon which the judgment was based did make reference to "an illegal conspiracy 
between Morton and Diamond, and other conspirators." The court then considered 
these findings in connection with the contents of the criminal record, the complaint 
and the civil consent decree, and drew the inference that "others" included Inter-
national. In the court's opinion this inference was sufficient to justify giving the con-
sent decree prima facie effect with respect to International's participation in the 
conspiracy found illegal in the judgment against Morton and Diamond. Finally, the 
court argued that the purpose of exempting consent decrees entered before the taking 
of testimony-to save government the time and expense of a protracted trial-would 
not be satisfied by exempting the consent decree in the instant case since the govern-
ment had already had to prove its allegations in the criminal prosecution. It therefore 
concluded that such an exemption would be contrary to congressional policy. 
The conclusion of prima facie effect as to International is subject to question for 
several reasons. In the first place, the testimony which the court treated as taken 
before the entry of the civil consent decree was not taken in that proceeding, but rather 
in the prior criminal prosecution which resulted in a verdict in favor of the defendants. 
Of course, heretofore it has always been assumed that the testimony must not only 
have been taken prior to the consent decree, but also in the same proceeding in which 
the decree or judgment occurs. Secondly, the court's decision fails to take account of 
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controlling points of law made during the government proceedings 
are available to him as authority; and he has access to the pleadings, 
transcripts, and exhibits of the government litigation as sources of 
evidence.26 In fact, as enunciated in Minnesota Mining and Leh,27 
the policy underlying section 5(b) is to enable private litigants to 
take advantage of any and all benefits that they might derive from 
the government litigation. It is arguable that if the tolling provision 
is not applicable in private suits against non-government defendants, 
private plaintiffs in many instances would not be able to take ad-
vantage of the information garnered in related government pro-
ceedings, since the time span between the alleged antitrust violation 
and the termination of the subsequent government investigation 
and litigation is often longer than the four-year statute of limita-
tions.28 It was basically for this reason that the court in the principal 
case considered it necessary to apply the tolling provision to non-
government defendants.29 
Clearly, the court's holding will result in the increased use by 
private plaintiffs of materials derived from prior government pro-
ceedings. Upon closer examination, however, it seems that the ap-
the fact that International agreed to the consent decree on the assumption that it 
was being entered before the taking of testimony and that therefore neither the decree 
nor any subsequent judgment would have prima facie effect as to it in a later treble 
damage action. Thirdly, International did not stipulate as to use of the criminal 
record in the civil proceeding; thus it is doubtful if, as to it, there was ever any testi-
mony submitted or taken in the civil proceeding. And lastly, the court was unwar-
ranted in assuming that the government did not save time and expense as a result of 
International's civil consent decree. On the contrary, had International remained in 
the proceeding it is possible that it would have forced the government to a full proof 
of all of its allegations. 
On this general issue compare Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., llO F. Supp. 
398 (D. Minn. 1952), appeal dismissed, 207 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1953) (consent decrees 
entered before the taking of testimony on remand are prima facie evidence as to the 
consenting party since a remand is in effect but a continuation of the first trial), with 
Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940) (a plea 
of nolo contendere entered in a new trial before the taking of testimony is exempt 
from the provisions of § 5(a) since a new trial proceeds as if none had ever gone before). 
26. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 3ll 
(1965). In addition to the increase in evidentiary benefits, private litigants will benefit 
from their ability to consolidate their damage claims and thus avoid the expenses 
involved in multiple litigation. It should be noted, however, that in any event the 
Federal Rules of Civil procedure would permit a plaintiff to move for a continuation 
and a consolidated trial once he has instituted a lawsuit against each defendant. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 18(a). 
27. Minnesota Mining&: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. llll, 
317 (1965); Leh v. General Petroleum, 382 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1965). 
28. In fact, "there are many instances where the statute of limitations as to a 
private cause of action may nearly have expired before suit is instituted by the Gov-
ernment under the antitrust laws." H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1955); 
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955). 
29. Principal case at 56. For a decision in which a court e.xpressly adopted the con-
trary position, see Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 
!954). 
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parent benefits to private plaintiffs resulting from the decision are 
to some degree illusory.30 Damage awards in private antitrust suits 
dealing with conspiratorial violations are jointly and severally re-
coverable.81 Moreover, the acts of a non-government defendant con-
spirator may be charged against a government defendant co-
conspirator without joining the former in the private suit against 
the latter.82 As a result, private plaintiffs need not sue each and every 
conspirator in order to get a full recovery. In fact, plaintiffs usually 
seek recovery only from the most financially responsible members of 
the conspiracy, who tend to be the principal conspirators. Since the 
government also usually focuses on the most active violators, private 
treble damage actions are in many instances brought against former 
government defendants. Thus, the holding in the principal case 
will be of practical value to private plaintiffs only in cases in which 
the government defendants are not financially responsible or in 
which the private plaintiff cannot bring suit against the government 
defendants because of his inability to establish the requisite con-
spiratorial relationship between them and the non-government de-
fendants that caused his injury.33 
Moreover, whatever advantages actually accrue to private plain-
tiffs are at the cost of a conflict with the purposes of the statute of 
limitations, which seeks to provide a definite and reasonable time 
span for the litigation of claims in order to reduce the element of 
surprise, to insure a good state of evidence, and to discourage delay 
in the filing of actions.34 The principal decision, by broadening the 
coverage of the Clayton Act's tolling provision,35 will, of course, 
30. On the other hand, the advantage heretofore enjoyed by non-government 
defendants as a result of the "party scope" restriction would appear to be both actual 
and substantial. In the first place, their potential liability to injured parties is limited 
to the normally shorter and certainly more definite four-year statute of limitations. 
Secondly, the running of the statute confers a total immunity since no right of con-
tribution appears to exist between them and any co-conspirator government defend-
ants subsequently found liable for treble damages to a private plaintiff. See generally 
18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 33 (1965). Were such a right to exist, the benefit gained 
from immunity to tolling might be offset by liability for contribution. 
31. Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284, 293 (7th Cir. 
1954); City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1903), 
afj'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). 
32. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 
(1957); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943); 
Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962); Riss & Co. v. 
Association of Am. R.Rs., 187 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1960). 
33. This possibility was recognized by the Eighth Circuit in its affirmance of the 
principal decision. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1967). 
34. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 
(1944); S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955). 
35. Dictum in the principal opinion suggests that the statute of limitations may be 
tolled against "a private defendant notwithstanding the fact that he was neither a 
party to nor a named conspirator in the Government action." Principal case at 54. The 
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result in increased litigation of stale and tenuous claims, and con-
sequently in increased reliance on time-tainted evidence at trial. 
Another undesirable consequence of the court's decision is its in-
hibiting effect on sound business planning. When a company be-
comes aware of a government prosecution involving its business 
associates, it is faced with a great uncertainty because of its own 
potential involvement in subsequent private litigation. Since the 
principal case extends this uncertainty over an indefinite period 
of time, the company might find its business position extremely 
difficult to evaluate, and thus might well be inhibited in making 
financial plans. Even a company that has actually been involved in 
a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws has a right to be free 
of stale claims and possible liability after a reasonable period.36 
Once the court in the principal case decided that the "party 
scope" requirement was properly satisfied, it was still faced with 
the problem of determining when tolling commenced and when it 
ceased.37 Plaintiffs' contention that the initiation of a grand jury 
proceeding starts the tolling38 was rejected on the language of sec-
tion 5(b) which requires that the government proceedings be for 
the purpose of preventing, restraining or punishing violations.30 
Although hearings before grand juries are preliminary criminal 
proceedings which, in the case of federal crimes, are instituted by 
the United States, their investigatorial and inquisitorial functions 
place them outside the statutory definition. Moreover, apart from 
this statutory argument, the congressional policy of aiding private 
plaintiffs by making the products of government proceedings avail-
able to them would not be furthered by the ruling for which plain-
tiffs contended. Grand juries decline to return an indictment in a 
Eighth Circuit found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,104, at 83,965 (8th Cir. May 22, 1967). 
36. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 
348-49 (1944). 
37. The determination of this time span is important for two reasons. In the first 
place, all claims originating more than four years prior to commencement of the tolling 
are barred by the statute, but those arising within four years thereof are sustained 
by the tolling until one year after termination of government proceedings. Secondly, 
the date upon which the tolling terminates fixes the point from which the additional 
one-year period begins to run. See § 5(b), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 16(b) (1964), quoted in note 7 supra. 
38. Brief for the State of Michigan, p. 18, principal case. Plaintiff argued that a 
grand jury proceeding is a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of § 5(b) on the 
grounds that grand jury proceedings are an integral phase of criminal prosecution, 
that these proceedings are analogous in nature to FTC hearings which have been held 
to toll the statute, and that for other purposes grand jury proceedings have been 
classified as "judicial proceedings." Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood 
Finishing Co. 381 U.S. 311 (1965). 
39. Section 5(b), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964), quoted 
in note 7 supra. See also Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 229 F.2d 714, 
718-19 (7th Cir. 1956). 
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high percentage of cases,40 and even when one is returned, the 
secrecy required often blocks the flow of beneficial information to 
the plaintiff. It would appear, therefore, that the court in the princi-
pal case was correct in concluding on the facts before it that the 
first government proceeding falling within the ambit of section 5(b) 
was the filing of a criminal indictment.41 
The court, having decided the commencement question, then 
moved to the issue of when the tolling of the statute of limitations 
should cease. Rejecting the argument that the tolling terminated 
on a defendant-by-defendant basis as the government litigation 
against each of them was concluded with the entry of consent de-
crees, 42 it held that tolling continued as to all parties until the gov-
ernment litigation against the last remaining government defendant 
had ceased.43 In so doing, the court relied on substantially the same 
rationale that it had rested on in deciding the issue of tolling as to 
non-government defendants.44 It reasoned that since the govern-
ment litigation might result in evidence and rulings of law applic-
able to defendants who had previously been released through 
consent decrees, the private plaintiffs would lose some of the benefit 
of such evidence and rulings if the running of the statute of limi-
tations were to resume as to these defendants upon their withdrawal 
from the government litigation.45 
In reaching this conclusion, the court correctly dismissed the 
legislative history of section 5(b) as inconclusive and subsequent 
judicial interpretation of the section as obsolete.46 The cases con-
struing section 5(b) prior to congressional amendment of the 
Clayton Act in 1955 regarded the tolling as terminating on a de-
fendant-by-defendant basis,47 and Congress made no changes in the 
40. The first two grand juries in the principal government litigation adjourned 
without returning an indictment. 
41. The criminal indictment was returned on June 28, 1961. 
42. Carey and International maintained that the government actions against them 
terminated upon the entry of their respective consent decrees. In support of their conten-
tion, they cited the following cases which hold that a government action terminates at 
different times for different defendants: Grengs v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
232 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO 
Radio Pictures, 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954) (expressly rejecting the conclusion that 
the pendency of the government proceeding continues against all the defendants as 
long as it endures against any); Tague v. Balaban, 146 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Ill. 1956); 
Manny v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 116 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Electric Theatre 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 113 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo. 1953). 
43. Principal case at 50. 
44. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra. 
45. The principal case would be an instance in point if one accepts the rationale 
of the supplemental opinion. See note 25 supra. See also Leh v. General Petroleum, 
382 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1965); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing 
Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318-320 (1965). 
46. Principal case at 47-49. 
47. Sec cases cited note 42 supra. These decisions hold that since the purpose of 
§ 5(b) is to assure the availability of the evidentiary benefits conferred by § 5(a), once 
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act to alter this interpretation. As suggested in connection with the 
"party scope" question, congressional acquiesence could reasonably 
be inferred from this inaction.48 However, doubt may be cast upon 
the significance of this legislative history. Among the several pro-
posed amendments submitted by the Attorney General's National 
Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws was a recommendation to 
Congress that the tolling of the statute of limitations under section 
5(b) terminate with respect to a particular defendant upon a plea of 
nolo contendere or the entry of a consent;_ decree by him.49 Congress 
declined to act on this recommendation although it did enact sev-
eral of the accompanying proposals. Thus, given the policy con-
siderations which support its decision, the court was on reasonably 
firm footing on the termination question. 
However, there is a countervailing policy consideration: the 
court's decision may result in a weakening of the incentive for a 
government antitrust defendant to enter into a consent decree. The 
consent decree is a valuable procedural device.50 The parties, as 
well as the public, benefit from the time and expense saved by 
avoiding a prolonged trial. The ability to avoid a long tolling of 
the statute of limitations is an added incentive for a government 
defendant to enter such a decree. This added incentive will not be 
present, however, if, when a defendant enters a consent decree, the 
statute continues to toll against him until the conclusion of the 
government's actions against his co-conspirators. On the other hand, 
since the remaining financial inducements to enter into such de-
crees are considerable, any overall decline in incentive might merely 
be marginal. 
The principal case represents a substantial deviation from prior 
judicial construction of the tolling provision. Although the court 
appears to have decided correctly the issues of commencement and 
a judgment or decree is available against a particular defendant as prima facie evi-
dence the rationale for considering a government prosecution as pending against that 
defendant ceases to exist. The crux of the cases is their assumption that protection 
of § 5(a) is the exclusive purpose of the tolling provision. If, however, the purpose of 
§ 5(b) is really more comprehensive-and Leh and Minnesota Mining appear to stand 
for this proposition-this aspect of the rationale of these decisions would appear to be 
destroyed. 
The force of the authority cited by defendants is weakened further by the fact 
that the cases are all district or circuit court decisions arising out of the same govern-
ment prosecution and are interdependent in their holdings. Thus the precedent is not 
as comprehensive and persuasive as the number of cases would seem to indicate. See 
Reply Memorandum of Illinois and Indiana Plaintiffs, pp. 3-4, principal case. 
48. See note 23 supra. 
49. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITI'EE To STUDY THE ANTI· 
TRUST LAws, Recommendation 2C (1955). 
50. Congress took cognizance of this fact when it exempted consent decrees entered 
before the taking of testimony from the prima facie effect given to judgments under 
§ 5(a). See § 5(a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964), quoted in 
note 25 supra. 
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termination, on the basic question of "party scope" it failed to 
recognize considerations which might well have required it to reach 
the opposite result. It is to be hoped that this will not be the final 
word; future courts faced with the same problem should weigh 
more carefully the practical consequences of the alternative de-
cisions before deciding where to strike the balance. 
